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SUMMARY JUDGMENTS IN NEW YORK
A STATISTICAL STUDY*
LEONARD S. SAXEt
The summary judgment, as it is known in New York, originated in
England in 1855 and was amplified there in 1873.1 So successful did
it prove, that Sir Frederick Pollock, in 1912, wrote of it: "Remember-
ing that in England, at any rate, the majority of actions are unde-
fended, we cannot doubt that Order XIV (authorizing summary
judgments) is among the most beneficent inventions of modem pro-
cedure. ' 2
The summary judgment procedure was inaugurated in New York
on October i, 1921, as a means for disposing without trial in certain
civil cases, of sham and frivolous answers-defenses groundless in fact
or in law. As originally worded in Rules of Civil Practice No. 13, it
was provided:
"When an answer is served in an action to recover a debt or
liquidated demand arising,
i. on a contract, express or implied, sealed or not sealed; or
2. on a judgment for a stated sum; the answer may be struck
out and judgment entered thereon on motion, and the affidavit
of the plaintiff or of any other person having knowledge of the
facts, verifying the cause of action and stating the amount
claimed, and his belief that there is no defense to the action; un-
less the defendant by affidavit, or other proof, shall show such
facts as may be deemed, by the judge hearing the motion, suffi-
cient to entitle him to defend."
This summary judgment rule, limited as will be observed to con-
tract cases for liquidated or set amounts, was in effect in New York,
for over ten years without change.
Although it has been truly said that it takes time and often a long
time to make a new remedy thoroughly operative, 3 as early as Janu-
ary, 1924, the rule was recognized as avoiding much unrighteous
*This article has been developed from a study made for the Commission on the
Administration of Justice in New York State.
tLecturer on New York Practice, Harvard Law School.
'For the history and nature of the summary judgment procedure, see the out-
standing article on the subject, Clark & Samenow, The Summary Judgment (1929)
38 YALE L. J. 423.
2POLLOCK, THE GENIUS OF THE ComoN LAw (1912) 83.
3CLA K, FIRST REPORT OF THE CONNECTICUT JUDICIAL COUNCIL (1928) 42.
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delay.4 It has been called "the outstanding achievement of the Civil
Practice Revision of 1921.''
One might have supposed that the clear merit of the summary
judgment would have .been quickly recognized and adopted with
enthusiasm by other jurisdictions, but this has not been so. At the
present time the summary judgment exists' in varying degrees and
scope in England,7 Ontario," and many parts of the British Com-
monwealth, 9 California (but only in the lower courts),"0 Connecticut,"
Massachusetts,2 Michigan," New Jersey,'14 Rhode Island, 5 and Wis-
consin."
The relative slowness with which the summary judgment has been
adopted by other jurisdictions is more easily understood when one con-
siders the history of the remedy in New York. As early as 1885,
David Dudley Field, famed as the originator of New York Code
Practice, had recommended it for negotiable instruments and similar
liquidated demands.' 7 In I911 Justice Adolph J. Rodenbeck, cham-
pion of simplified and improved practice, had brought the matter to
the attention of the New York Bar. 8
From 1912 to 1919 the New York State Board of Statutory Con-
solidation on the Simplification of the Civil Practice in the Courts of
New York considered the subject. The. aim of the summary judg-
ment was stated to be to relieve commercial cases from sham de-
fenses by giving the "widest latitude practicable" to the courts.19
During the period of the Board's labors, the New Jersey Practice Act
of 1912 was promulgated. That Act however merely adopted a small
'McCall, Summary Judgment Under New York Rules (1924) 1o A. B. A. J. 22.
5J. L. Rothschild, quoted in (1925) 5 ORE. L. REv. I, at i8.
6See supra note I, infra note 25.
7ORDER III, RULE 6; ORDERS XIV, XIVA and XV. See Clark & Samenow,
supra note I, at 424.
8Clark & Samenow, op. cit. supra note I, at 436.
'Id., at 439.
"°CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. (Deering, i93i) §§ 83r d, 831 h.
"
1 CONN. RULES OF CIVIL PRACTICE, No. 14A I.
"MASS. GEN. LAWS (I92I) C. 23I, § 59-
"3MIcH. COURT RULES 3o, See. 7. This section provides that in any action at
law either party may move by affidavit for judgment on the ground that no
question of fact exists. No statistics concerning the operation of the new section
are available.
"IN. J. PRACTICE ACT, RULES 80-84. (formerly RULES 57-60 and 79).
15R. I. GEN. LAWS (1929) C. 1343.
"WIs. STAT. (r929) 270.635.
"A. B. A. REP. (1885) pp. 323, 363.
11(I91i) N. Y. STATE BAR Assoc. REP. 354, 442.
1 REPORT N. Y. STATE BOARD OF STATUTORY CONSOLIDATION (1912) p. 14.
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portion of the English rule.20 The New York Board oscillated be-
tween suggesting the English rule2- and an all-embracing rule pro-
viding for a summary judgment in any type of action.22
In 192o, out of the Board's labors grew the Convention to Form-
ulate Rules of Civil Practice, of which the late Justice Alfred R. Page
of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First
Judicial Department, was Chairman. Justice Page had been in
favor of adopting the English rule which the Board had proposed in
1915. Finally, however, this, together with the'broader summary
judgment idea, was abandoned and a modification of the summary
judgment rule of New Jersey was adopted as Rule of Civil Practice
No. 113, set forth above.2
As has been pointed out elsewhere,2 4 the adoption of this narrower
rule was solely due to the desire that at least an entering wedge for the
new procedure should be made.
In the summer of 1931, the writer conceived that a statistical
study of the actual operation of the summary judgment-the effect
of the rule of law in action-might be useful. The difficulties con-
fronting an individual engaged in making a comprehensive survey
soon became apparent, but many of the facts were nevertheless
gathered, centralized and analyzed.
Thereafter, the Commission on the Administration of Justice in
New York State loaned the services of the writer to Presiding Justice
Edward R. Finch of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court,
First judicial Department,25 under whose leadership an amendment
of Rule 1 13 was adopted by a majority of the Justices of the Ap-
pellate Divisions of the Supreme Court, effective April 16, 1932,
which confirmed the benefits of Rule i i3 and vastly increased its
20See supra note 13.
21VoL. I, REPORT OF N. Y. STATE BOARD OF STATUTORY CONSOLIDATION (I915)
pp. 23, 127, 212, 393. nlbid, VOL. 5 (i919) RULE 231, p. 89.
nThe modification of the New Jersey Rule consisted in (I) omitting a third
category of the New Jersey Rule permitting summary judgments "upon a
statute" at the'request and suggestion of the Attorney General of New York on
the ground that in an action for a statutory penalty under Section 248 of the Civil
Practice Act since a defendant would not be forced to verify an answer he should
not, by the proposed rule, be forced to swear to an affidavit in defense; (2) In
omitting the provision of the New Jersey Rule 60, which read "Leave to defend
may be given unconditionally, or upon such terms as to giving security, or time or
mode of trial, or otherwise, as may be deemed just." (cf. Finch, Summary Judg-
ments Under the Civil Practice Act in New York (1924) 49 A. B. A. REp. 588, and
2 PAGE, LECTURES ON LEGAL Topics (1920-21) pp. 243,255).
2'Finch, op. cit. supra note 23, and ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK YEAR BooK (193) pp. 450,452.
21Finch, Summary Judgment Procedure (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 504,507.
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scope. So well did this improvement function that the Justices of the
Appellate Divisions, fourteen months later, extended the summary
judgment procedure to summary judgments dismissing the com-
plaint in the contract and equity types of cases contained in the fore-
going amendment of 1932 and in, all types of actions where a "docu-
mentary defense" was believed to be conclusive against the plaintiff's
case. Rule 113 as thus amended, effective June 16th, 1933, gives
New York by far the most advanced summary judgment procedure
of any jurisdiction under the common law. It provides, as follows:
"When an answer is served in-an action,
i. To recover a debt or liquidated demand arising on a con-
tract express or implied in fact or in law, sealed or not sealed; or
2. -To recover a debt or liquidated demand arising on a
judgment for a stated sum; or
3. On a statute where the sum sought to be recovered is a
sum of money other than a penalty; or
4. To recover an unliquidated debt or demand for a sum of
money only arising on a contract express or implied in fact or in
law, sealed or not sealed, other than for breach of promise to
marry; or
5. To recover possession of a specific chattel or chattels with
or without a claim for the hire thereof or for damages for the tak-
ing or detention thereof; or
6. To enforce or foreclose a lien or mortgage; or
7. For specific performance of a contract in writing for the
sale or purchase of property, including such alternative and
incidental relief as the case may require; or
8. For an accounting arising on a written contract, sealed or
not sealed.
The complaint may be dismissed or answer may be struck out
and judgment entered in favor of either party on motion upon
the affidavit of a party or of any other person having knowledge
of the facts, setting forth such evidentiary facts as shall, if the
motion is made on behalf of the plaintiff, establish the cause of
action sufficiently to entitle plaintiff to judgment, and if the
motion is made on behalf of the defendant such evidentiary
facts, including copies of all documents, as shall fully disclose
defendant's contentions and show that his denials or defenses are
sufficient to defeat plaintiff, together with the belief of the mov-
ing party either that there is no defense to the action or that
the action has no merit, as the case may be, unless the other
party, by affidavit or other proof, shall show such facts as may be
deemed by the judge hearing the motion sufficient to entitle him
to a trial of the issues. If upon such motion made on behalf of a
defendant it shall appear that the plaintiff is entitled to judg-
ment, the judge hearing the motion may award judgment to
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the plaintiff even though the plaintiff has not made a cross-
motion therefor.
If the plaintiff or defendant in any action set forth in sub-
divisions 3, 4 or 5 hereunder shall fail to show such facts as may
be deemed by the judge hearing the motion to present any tri-
able issue of fact other than the question of the amount of
damages for which judgment should be granted, an assessment
to determine such amount shall forthwith be ordered for im-
mediate hearing to be tried by a referee, by the court alone or
by the court and a jury, whichever shall be appropriate. Upon
the rendering of the assessment, judgment in the action shall be
rendered forthwith.
When in any actions in cases set forth in subdivisions 6, 7 and
8 hereunder the judge hearing the motion has been convinced
that there is no preliminary triable issue of fact, the court shall
forthwith render an appropriate judgment or order, and thence-
forth the action shall proceed in the ordinary course.
Where an answer is served in any action setting forth a de-
fense which is sufficient as a matter of law, where the defense is
founded upon facts established prima facie by documentary
evidence or official record, the complaint may be dismissed on
motion unless the plaintiff by affidavit or other proof shall show
such facts as may be deemed by the judge hearing the motion
sufficient to raise an issue with respect to the verity and con-
clusiveness of such documentary evidence or official record.
This rule shall be applicable to counterclaims, so that either
party may move with respect to the same as though the counter-
claim were an independent action. The court in its discretion
may provide for the withholding of entry of judgment until the
disposition of the issue in the main case.
This rule shall be applicable to all pending actions.12
Despite the adoption of the amended Rule 113, it seems of some
importance that the statisticl record of the summary judgment
remedy, as it existed substantially up to the time of the amendment,
should be known.
SouRcEs AND EXTENT OF THIS STUDY
The writer desired to make comparisons between the operation of
the summary judgment in New York and in other jurisdictions.
There are statistics available, however, only in England and Rhode
Island. The English statistics2 7 show that for the King's Bench
Division in England, over four times as many summary judgments as
judgments after trial, are entered:
8For partial derivation of the new rule's component parts, see Finch, op. cit.
supra note 25 and N. Y. L. J., Mar. 14, 1932, p. I393, and May I6, 1932, p. 2724.
27CIVIL JUDICIAL STATISTICS, (1923-29) I6.
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Year Applications under Judgments under JudgmentsI Order XIV Order XIV after trial
1923 14,462 6,773 1,546
1924 x2,552 5,635 1,255
1925 ii,615 5,181 1,466
1926 10,519 4,718 1,279
1927 xo,165 4,280 1,258
1928 9,490 4,071 1,289
1929 10,584 4,409 1,310
Although these statistics would indicate an approximate eighty per
cent relief to the trial docket, 28 nevertheless, because the English
system includes a large corps of masters, it is not entirely comparable
to the summary judgment system in New York.29
In Rhode Island, sparse statistics indicate, rather than prove, the
value of the summary judgment.3"
Consequently, this study makes no comparisons with other juris-
dictions.
The period covered by this study includes from the effective date
of Rule of Civil Practice 113, October i, 1921, to January i, 1931,
with the exception of the Court of Appeals, where, in order to com-
plete the picture, the study was continued for one year, i. e., to Janu-
ary i, 1932.
The outstanding fact brought home to the writer in making this
study was that, with every fact a matter of record in court archives,
nevertheless, the simplest facts are ascertainable only with the ut-
most difficulty. For example, the salient question to answer in this
study was: To what extent has summary judgment procedure been
utilized in New York Courts? But, with one outstanding exception,
complete data concerning summary judgments in the courts of orig-
inal jurisdiction in New York State are unavailable except by reading"
the pleadings and papers filed in each individual case on file in the re-
spective courts--a Herculean task.
There has been a page to page examination of all of the official
reports (Court of Appeals, Appellate Division and Miscellaneous)
from which the following facts appear:
In the Court of Appeals Reports, 1923 through 1931, there were 30
reported summary judgment decisions exclusive of memoranda, com-
prising 192 pages of opinions.
28Sunderland, An Appraisal of English Procedure (1926) 9 JOURN. AMER.
JuDic. Soc. 164, 165, and (1926) 0 A. B.A. REP. 242,244,245.
22See CLARK, FIRST REPORT OF CONNECTICUT JUDICIAL COUNCIL (1928) p. 41.
30FIRST REPORT RHODE ISLAND JUDICIAL COUNCIL (r927) p. I2; FOURTH
REPORT (1930) pp. 30,35; and FIFTH REPORT (1931) pp. 44,52.
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In the Appellate Division Reports, 1922 through 193o, summary
judgment decisions, exclusive of memoranda, were:
First Department ........... 93 decisions 332 pages
Second Department ......... 22 decisions 87 pages
Third Department .......... 9 decisions 22 pages
Fourth Department ......... Ix decisions 32 pages
Total ................. 135 decisions 473 pages
Reversals by the Court of Appeals rendered 6 of these decisions,
comprising 27 pages, academic.
In the Miscellaneous Reports, October 1, 1921, through 1930,
there were 1 77 summary judgment decisions, exclusive of memoranda,
comprising 478 pages. Reversals by the Appellate Divisions or the
Court of Appeals rendered 8 of these decisions, comprising 24 pages,
academic.
Due to natural limitations, it was impossible to obtain statistical
data covering all the courts in the State and the writer accordingly
confined himself chiefly to cases appearing in the official reports, and,
in view of the proportionately large volume of commercial litigation
in the County of New York, to the courts of original jurisdiction in
that County as well as to following such cases in the appellate courts.
The analysis with respect to the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court for the First Judicial Department was made by a page to page
examination of the confidential' conference abstracts of that court,
the so-called "Bible", which was kindly placed at the writer's dis-
posal by Presiding Justice Finch.
The Analysis for the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court of the
First Judicial Department was made by a page to page examination
of the minute books of that court.
For the Supreme Court, New York County, the figures have been
obtained from an analysis of the Special Term for Trials, Part III
calendar cards and statistical sheets.3 '
"*Valuable information complementing the data contained in this study will be
found in the JUDICIAL STATISTICS OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; statistics
concerning the work of the Court of Appeals in the ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE NEW
YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION; statistics concerning the proportion of opinions to
decisions in various courts, prepared by the late Alden Rosbrook ((1925) 10
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 103); CASES AND POINTS, which consist of records and
briefs in all appeals in New York except from the Municipal Court of the City of
New York and which are preserved for the benefit of those interested; The Sum-
mary Judgment, by Clark & Samenow ((1929) 38 YALE L. J. 423); and finally, the
statistical study of 250 sample cases taken from the Supreme Court, New York
County, Summary Judgments in the Supreme Court of New York, by Felix S.
Cohen ((1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 825).
The writer wishes to express his thanks for the kind co-operation and assistance
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRACTICE
In connection with the following tables and for the benefit of those
unacquainted with summary judgment practice in the New York
Courts of original and appellate jurisdiction, the following should be
noted: Generally speaking, and without any scientific precision with
respect to limitations on jurisdiction, the Municipal Court of the
City of New York hears litigation for sums of money up to $i,ooo in
amount, 32 and the City Court of the City of New York, for sums up
to $3,ooo, since 1927,3 and prior to that time up to $2,000. The Su-
preme Court of the State of New York has general jurisdiction un-
limited in amount. However, for the sake of keeping litigants in the
proper inferior court, statutory costs are refused to a successful
plaintiff who should have brought his action in a lower court.3
With respect to the courts of original jurisdiction, the practice in
the Supreme Court, New York County, since October 1, 1921, has
been to have the summary judgment motions returfable before the
justice presiding at Special Term for Trials, Part III, the equity part
devoted to the trial of suits in equity, except during the three summer
recess months when the motions have been returnable before the
justice presiding at Special Term, Part I, the part devoted to con-
tested motions. Special Term, Part III, is also the calendar part for
equity suits, and up to the October Term, 193I, the practice was for
the justice presiding in Special Term, Part III, to assign and dis-
tribute summary judgment motions among the several justices sitting
in the equity trial term parts, including himself. The motions were
then heard by the several justices daily, prior to the hearings of the
trials in their respective parts. However, since October Term,
1931, the justice sitting at Special Term, Part III, retains and dis-
poses of all summary judgment motions and the other Special Term
Justices devote themselves exclusively to the trial of cases.
In the City Court of the City of New York summary judgments
have always been returnable to and determined by the justice sitting
in Special Term, Part I, devoted to contested motions.
In the Municipal Court of the City of New York, summary judg-
ment motions have always been returnable in the district where the
summons is filed. They are determined either by the justice sitting
in the calendar part, known as Part I, or, if other judges are sitting in
of Messrs. Campbell and Doane of the Appellate Division, First Department;
Messrs. Bensel and Webber of the Appellate Term, First Department; and
Messrs. Tierney and Salzman of Special Term for Trials, Part III, Supreme
Court, New York County. 3MUNICIPAL CT. CODE § 6.
3N. Y. CiTy CT. ACT § x6. 3'Civi PiiAc. AcT § 1474.
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the same district at the same time, the motions may be assigned to
other parts.
The practice with respect to permitting oral argument or requiring
submission of all motion papers without hearing, is a matter which
in all of the courts rests in the discretion of the judge before whom the
motion comes.
With respect to courts of appellate jurisdiction, appeals from the
Supreme Court go to the Appellate Divisions of the Supreme Court,
and thence to the Court of Appeals. Appeals from the City Court
of the City of New York and the Municipal Court of the City of New
York, go to the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court and thence to
the Appellate Division and Court of Appeals. The provisions per-
mitting appeals from the Supreme Court and from the City Court are
similar. 5 Appeals as of right lie from all orders granting summary
judgment. Within the period covered by this study, appeals as of
right lay from orders denying summary judgment in all courts of civil
jurisdiction of New York City, except the Municipal Court.
Concerning the practice on appeals, it is important to note that
from the first reported Appellate Division case, Dwan v. Massarene,
199 App. Div. 872, 192 N. Y. Supp. 577 decided February io, 1922,
until the opinion in Interstate Pulp & Paper Co. Inc. v. New York
Tribune, 207 App. Div. 453, 202 N. Y. Supp. 232 decided December
21, 1923, a period of over two-years from the effective date of sum-
mary judgment procedure, appeals were not permitted from the
Supreme Court to the Appellate Division or from the City Court to
the Appellate Term, from orders denying a motion for summary
judgment. Thus, the efficacy of summary judgment procedure was
not subjected to a true test for the first two and one-quarter years of
its existence, and this fact should be borne in mindin a consideration
6f the facts and figures hereinafter set forth. Since the Interstate case,
appeals have lain as of right from orders denying summary judgments
both from the Supreme Court to the Appellate Division, and from the
City Court to the Appellate Term. However, an order denying
summary judgment in the Municipal Court within the period covered
by this study was not appealable to the Appellate Term as of right.
ANALYSES WITH CONCLUSIONS
Supreme Court, New York County
Before a case appears upon the Trial Term calendar of the Su-
preme Court, issue must be joined either by defendant's answer to
plaintiff's complaint, or by plaintiff's reply to the defendant's answer,
'
5Civn. PRAc. ACT § 6O9, N. Y. City Ct. Act. § 57.
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and then the case must be noticed for trial.' The motion for summary
judgment may be made at any time after issue has been joined. 8
Under the system prevailing in the Supreme Court and the City Court
of the City of New York, an action may be begun by an attorney
issuing a summons, and usually until and unless the action is noticed
for trial or some incidental court relief is asked no papers need be
filed in the court archives.17  Consequently, an exact apportioning
of the number or proportion of tort or contract cases litigated is im-
possible.
Nevertheless, the Trial Term calendars are some indication of the
relative proportion of contract to tort cases. The analysis of the
Commission on Administration of Justice made from a study of cases
on the Trial Term calendars of the Supreme Court, New York
County, as of October, 193o and October, '931, indicates that about
30% of those cases are on contract. The total number of new issues
placed upon the Trial Term calendar of the Supreme Court, New
York County, for the years 1922 through 1930, including those undis-
posed of on the calendar on January I, 1922, as well as thbse re-
stored to the calendar during 1922, was i21,65o. Assuming that 3o%
constitutes the average percentage of contract to total cases on that
calendar, the total number of contract cases on the Trial Term calen-
dar for the nine years from January i, 1922 through 1930, was 36,395.
No one can ascertain or estimate the large number of law suits
which the rule has prevented, nor the number of defaults in answer-
ing due to the rule, although it is realized that such preventive merit
is not the least of the benefits of summary judgment procedure. But,
we do know from the official figures that the total number of summary
judgment motions made in Special Term, Part III, for the above
period, was 4,228 (TABLE III). This figure does not include sum-
mary judgment motions made at Special Term, Part I during the
three summer months. In other words, the 4,228 motions constitute
only about 75% of all summary judgment motions made, assuming
that a similar proportion of such motions was made during the
summer months as during the balance of the year31 Therefore, the
total number of summary judgment motions for the nine-year period
from October 1, 1921 to January I, 1931, was probably 5,6oo, con-
stituting 15.4% of the probable total number of contract cases on the
36Saunders v. Delano et al, 135 Misc. 455,238 N. Y. Supp. 337 (1930).
37CIVIL PRAc. ACT § 100.
38Figures of the Institute of Law, The Johns Hopkins University, for the Su-
preme Court, New York County, for 1930, show 917 contract cases disposed of by
all kinds of motions. Judicial Statistics for that year for Special Term, Part III
show 395 summary judgments granted.
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Trial Term calendar. These figures assume additional importance
when it is realized that before the amendment of the summary judg-
ment rule the motion could be made only in an extremely limited
-number of contract cases. 31
Of these 5,6oo motions, over 700 were withdrawn or marked off the
calendar, indicating either that a satisfactory adjustment had been
reached or was despaired of.40 Of the 4,900 motions remaining, an
average of 57%, or 2,800, were granted, and after appeals had been
exhausted the ultimate number ganted was reduced to 2,774, a total
elimination through summary judgment procedure of approximately
3,474 cases.
For the year 1930, the Supreme Court, New York County, Trial
Term, with 14Y2 parts in session, sitting 13,273 hours, disposed of
1,309 trials by jury, 1,i61 trials without jury, 8 inquests by jury and
385 inquests without jury, a total of 2,863 cases.4 ' The average time
per case devoted by Trial Term over the period from 1922 through
1930, lumping'together trials by jury and by court alone, and in-
quests either by jury or by court alone, was 4 hours.4
Now, although it is true that we do not know the proportion in
which the 3,474 cases eliminated by summary judgment procedure
would otherwise have been disposed of, that is, by trial or inquest, by
jury or by court alone, and while the time which would have been
devoted to their disposition in the absence of summary judgment
procedure is unknown, it seems fair to state that summary judgment
procedure, 192 1 through 193o, eliminated more business than was ac-
complished by the 14Y2 parts of the Trial Term of the Supreme Court,
"9See supra p. 237.41Some caution should be used in considering the number of withdrawals of
motions for summary judgment as the statistics leave much to be desired. Mr.
Cohen (op. cit. supra note 31) found that 30 or 12% out of a sample of 25o con-
secutive cases had been marked off or withdrawn on the call of the calendar in
New York County, but does not say how many of these were restored or re-
newed. The official figures for Supreme Court, for 1923 to 1927 inclusive, in-
dicate that 2o% to 25% of the motions were marked off or withdrawn, but that
for 1927, 1928 and 1930 only from 2Y% to 7% were withdrawn. Concerning the
1923 to 1927 figures, however, it is believed that the truth of the situation is that
motions withdrawn and then restored to the calendar were counted more than
once. If this is so, the probability is that somewhere between 2y2% and 12%
of all motions for summary judgment noticed will be withdrawn. No more
definite percentage can be stated.
41JUDICIAL STATISTICS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK IN
THE FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT (1930) p. 31.
42Figures of the Institute of Law, The Johns Hopkins University, for the Su-
preme Court, New York County, for 193o Trial Term, show that 56% of the dis-
positions in Trial Term were in tort cases and 44% in contract cases.
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New York County, for the year 193o, and roughly, was equivalent to
about an average full year's work of Trial Term over the period of
1922 through 1930. In other words, about i/9th or 11% of all Trial
Term work of the Supreme Court, New York County, has been
eliminated by summary judgment procedure. This, as has been
noted, is totally ignoring the tremendous but unascertainable elimi-
nation of litigation and interposition of answers due to the fact that the
procedure exists.
The figures for 193o of Special Term, Part III show that 295
motions for summary judgment were heard on oral argument while
367 were submitted without argument, that is, less than 5o% were
argued orally. The same figures show that the average time for the
oral argument per motion heard was about 16 minutes. Thus the to-
tal judicial labor involved in the elimination of the 3,474 cases, in
disposing of the 5,6oo motions, of which 4,900 were either argued or
submitted was at the very most 6oo hours of judicial court-room time,
on the conservative assumption that 5o% or 2,450 motions, were
argued orally on an average basis of 15 minutes per motion. To this
judicial labor in the court of original jurisdiction must be added that
of the Appellate Division in handling the 360 appeals which resulted,
and that of the Court of Appeals in handling the 39 ultimate appeals
which resulted, together with all of the incidental motions concerning
such appeals.
The net result, therefore, is that due to summary judgment pro-
cedure, disregarding litigation entirely discouraged and suits unde-
fended, and disregarding also the tremendous saving of time to liti-
gants who generally have to await their turn on a congested calendar,
there was a saving:
Without argument .................................. 700 cases
After submission or argument and appeals ............. 2,774 cases
Total ....................................... 3,474 cases
or, figuring court room time at an average of 4 hours per case, i3,9oo
hours of Trial Term court-room time.
The total judicial cost of this saving was at most some 6oo hours of
Trial Term court-room time, an unknown amount of chambers time,
and the time for handling 360 appeals to the Appellate Division and
39 appeals to the Court of Appeals with the motions incidental to
such appeals, a net saving of 13,3oo hours of Trial Term time.
Perhaps even more important than the saving of the time of the
cdurt is the increase in speed with which a plaintiff may reduce his
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claim to judgment due to the summary judgment system. Before
Rule 113 was inaugurated, a plaintiff was forced to await his turn on a
congested calendai for many months only to have the defendant de-
fault when the case was reached for trial. This situation the original
Rule 113 alleviated considerably, since the motion for summary judg-
ment could be made at any time after issue was joined.43 The en-
largement of Rule 113 presents far greater possibilities in this di-
rection.
It appears, moreover, that together with an increase in its utili-
zation, the efficiency of summary judgment in the Supreme Court,
New York County, has steadily improved. Messrs. Clark and Same-
now referring to the figures for Special Term, Part III, for 1926 and
1927 only (TABLE III) say." "the proportion of grantings to denials
shows the remedy has not reached the peak of efficiency." The
probable meaning of this observation is that for 1926 and 1927 there
were too many denials of the motion. The fact that the proportion of
summary judgments granted to those denied rose from 58%-42% in
1926 and 54o-46% in 1927, to 61ty6-39% in 1929 and 1930, in-
dicates that the efficiency of the procedure has improved. The
results of appeals to the Appellate Division also speak well for the effi-
ciency of the procedure in the Supreme Court, New York County,
since the percentage of reversals of grantings is 28.43% and of denials
23.49%, i. e., 58 of 204 grantings and 39 of i66 denials were reversed
by the Appellate Division.
Conclusions With Respect to the Supreme Court, New York County
As the summary judgment remedy has become better known, both
its utilization and efficiency have increased in the Supreme Court,
New York County. It now appears to be granted with finality in well
over 5o% of the applications and to have eliminated about 1/9 or
i1% of all Trial Term work in New York County, resulting in a net
saving of 13,3oo hours of Trial Term time in the first nine years of its
use. Besides this great saving of judicial time, it has markedly ex-
pedited the disposition of cases to the- benefit of litigant plaintiffs.
'
3The figures of the Institute of Law, The Johns Hopkins University, for the
Supreme Court, New York County, for 193o, show that there were disposed of by
defaults of all kinds, 76 tort cases and 4,678 contract cases, while the same author-
ity shows that in the City Court of the City of New York for New York County,
there were disposed of by defaults of all kinds, 198 tort cases and 4,322 contract
cases.
"'(1929)38 YALE L. J. 455, n. 3.
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Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, First Judicial Department
With respect to the 360 summary judgment appeals from the Su-
preme Court, New York County, the court of original jurisdiction
had granted 199 or 55.28%, and denied 161, or 44.72%. After the
respective sifting of the 360 appeals in the Appellate Division and
the 39 subsequent appeals to the Court of Appeals, there resulted 173
ultimate grantings and 187 ultimate denials, a proportion of 48.01%
granted and 51.99% denied. Of these 360 appeals, the combined
effect of the Appellate Division and Court of Appeals was 263 ulti-
mate affirmances and'97 ultimate reversals, 73.o6% affirmances and
26.94% reversals. Of these 36o appeals, the Appellate Division
affirmed in 265 instances 143 or 7 1.86% of the 199 granted, and 122 or
75.78% of the 16i denied, and reversed in 95 instances, 56 or 28.14%
of 199 granted and 39 or 24.22% of the i61 denied, being 73.61%
affirmances and 26.39% reversals.
Of these 36o appeals, the Court of Appeals reviewed 39, rendering
28 affirmances and ii reversals, 72.79% affirmances and 27.21% re-
versals. Of the i 3 reversals, 9 resulted in denying motions that had
theretofore been granted, and 2 in granting motions that had there-
tofore been denied. In several instances, appeals were dismissed by
the Court of Appeals on motion, which left the Appellate Division
decision the ultimate disposition.
Conclusions with Respect to Appellate Division of the Supreme Court,
First JudicialDepartment
i. The burden placed by summary judgment procedure upon the
Appellate Division, First Department, is quite small, only 2.9% of
the total decisions over a nine-year period being concerned therewith,
and only 332 pages (total number of pages for Appellate Division,
First Department decisions unknown). The burden is minimized to a
vanishing point when one considers that without any summary judg-
ment system, the cases concerned would have undoubtedly generated
at least an offsetting amount of appellate work. Also a very light
burden has been placed upon the court from the procedural aspect
of the remedy, which has been settled quickly and with certainty.
Almost the entire work comes from the New York County Supreme
Court, very little from the Bronx County Supreme Court or the Ap-
pellate Term.
2. The proportion of affirmances and reversals of summary judg-
ment motions is not out of line when compared with the proportion
of affirmances and reversals to total cases, nor when the affirmances
and reversals of motions granted below is compared to the affirm-
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ances and reversals of motions denied below. The Appellate Di-
vision is slightly more inclined to reverse a summary judgment
granted below than one denied below, as is shown by its own figures of
28.43% of grantings reversed as compared to 23.49% of denials re-
versed, and yet the Court of Appeals, on review, seems to have de-
cided that the Appellate Division is not quite strict enough in that
regard.
The Court of Appeals
The tables with respect to summary judgment in the Court of
Appeals from 1923 through 1931, are sufficiently full to require no
particular comment, except to observe that in addition to the 67
appeals there were i8 motions to dismiss appeals concerning sum-
mary judgments. Of these i8, 8 were denied. The appeals were later
heard or submitted and decided, and are included in the 67 appeals
tabulated (TABLE VI). The io motions to dismiss appeals which
were granted, leaving the Appellate Division decisions below de-
cisive, resulted in the granting of summary judgment in 4 instances
and the denial in 6.
Conclusion with Respect to the Court of Appeals
The burden placed by summary judgment procedure upon the
Court of Appeals is very small, whether viewed from the number of
decisions, 1.4% of the total, or number of reported pages 1.6% of the
total, and a very light burden is placed on that court from the pro-
cedural aspect of the remedy, which has been quickly settled and with
certainty. Furthermore, in the absence of summary judgment pro-
cedure at least an offsetting amount of appellate work would un-
doubtedly have been generated.
Appellate Term of the Supreme Court First Judicial Department
With respect to the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court, First
Judicial Department, 1922 through 193o, the manner of arrival of
cases was as follows:-
From the City Court of the City of New York, New York
County ............................................ 235
Bronx County (established 1927) ........................ 13
Total ...................................... 248
From the Municipal Court of the City of New York, Borough
of M anhattan ...................................... 562
Borough of Bronx ................................ :.... 47
Total. ................................ ... 6og
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The City Court of the City of New York
Of thie 248 summary judgment appeals from the City Court, the
courts of original jurisdiction had granted 178, or 71.77%, and denied
70, or 28.23%. After the respective sifting of the 248 appeals in the
Appellate Term, and the 4 appeals to the Appellate Division, there
resulted' 148 ultimate grantings and ioo ultimate denials, being
59.68% granted, 40.32% denied.
Of these 248 appeals the combined effect of the Appellate Term,
Appellate Division and Court of Appeals was 172 ultimate affirm-
ances and 76 ultimate reversals, 68.35% affirmances and 30.65%
reversals.
Of these 248 appeals, the Appellate Term affirmed in 171 instances,
124 or 69:66% of the 178 grantings, and 47 or 67.14% of the 70
denials, 68.96% affirmances and 31.04% reversals.
Of these 248 appeals the Appellate Division reviewed 4, rendering 3
affirmance§ and i reversal, 75% affirmances, 25% reversals. Thei reversal resulted in the granting of a motion that had theretofore
been granted by the City Court and reversed by the Appellate Term.
Of these 248 appeals the Court of Appeals reviewed i, rendering an
affirmance of a motion theretofore granted by the City Court and
affirmed by both the Appellate Term and Appellate Division.
For detailed analyses, see tables.
The Municipal Court of the City of New York
Of the 6og summary judgment appeals from the Municipal Court
of the City of New York for Manhattan and Bronx Boroughs to the
Appellate Term of the Supreme Court, First Department, the courts
of original jurisdiction had granted 538 or 88.34% and denied 71 or
ii.66%. After the respective sifting of the 6o9 appeals in the Ap-
pellate Term and Appellate Division there resulted 291 ultimate
grantings and 318 ultimate denials, being 47.78% granted and 52.22%
denied.
Of these 6og appeals, the combined effect of the Appellate Term
and Appellate Division was 346 ultimate affirmances and 263 ulti-
mate reversals, 56.81% affirmances, 43.i9% reversals.
Of these 6og appeals, the Appellate Term affirmed in 3 4 7 instances,
284 or 52.79% of the 538 original grantings and 63 or 88.73% of the 71
denials, 56.98% affirmances, 43.12% reversals.
Of these 6og appeals, the Appellate Division reviewed 4, rendering
3 affirmances and i reversal, 75% affirmances, 25% reversals. The
one reversal resulted in denying a motion that had theretofore been
granted by the Municipal Court and affirmed by the Appellate Term.
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Over the period 1922 through i93o, total applications made to the
Appellate Division for leave to appeal from determinations of the Ap-
pellate Term numbered 1520 of which 225 or 14.83% were granted
and 1295 or 85.17% were denied. With respect to appeals from sum-
mary judgment determinations of the Appellate Term, the figures
show that of 6og such cases arising from the Municipal Court and 248
such cases arising from the City Court, a total of 857, only 8, 4 from
the Municipal Court and 4 from the City Court, went to the Ap-
pellate Division-less than I%. Of these 8, 4 (2 Municipal Court and
2 City Court cases) arrived in the Appellate Division by permission
of the Appellate Term, and the remaining 4 by permission of the Ap-
pellate Division.
From this we may conclude that summary judgments in the Muni-
cipal Court and City Court are, for all practical purposes, limited to
one appeal.
Conclusion with Respect to the Municipal Court of the City of New York
The figures shown in the foregoing study revealed that, although
the summary judgment procedure was highly successful in the Su-
preme Court for New York County and in the City Court of the
City of New York for New York and Bronx Counties, it was a relative
failure in the Municipal Court of the City of New York for the
Boroughs of Manhattan and Bronx. The study further revealed
that the probable cause for this lay in the fact that an appellate
review was allowed as a matter of right from a denial of a motion for
summary judgment in the Supreme Court and the City Court, but
was not-so allowed in the Municipal Court. The writer, in his report
to the Commission on the Administration of Justice in New York
State, therefore presented a complete argument in favor of correcting
that situation. Acting upon that report, the Commission recom-
mended and assisted in the adoption by the Legislature and the ap-
proval by the Governor of an amendment to the Municipal Court
Code remedying this defect.4
CONCLUSION
To conclude, the benefits of the summary judgment seem clearly
demonstrated from its decade of trial in the New York courts,-in its
tendency to discourage litigation over contracts and the interposition
of sham defenses, to effectuate settlements, to expedite judgments
and to lessen court congestion-in short, for its marked contribution
43LAws 1933, Chapter 351, effective September Ist, 1933, amending MuNic. CT.
CODE § 154, Sub-div. 6a.
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to the cause of speedy justice and the alleviation of the economic
waste of unnecessary and protracted litigation.
The summary judgment has not caused any adverse criticism.
On the contrary, its scope has been broadened. It is being urged that
it be further extended to apply to all actions, regardless of type,
equally on behalf of defendants and plaintiffs.46 A careful statistical
analysis of the way in which the amended rule is operating promises
to be useful in making a proper decision on that point and in indicat-
ing other means of strengthening and improving summary judgment
procedure..
NOTES ON THE FOLLOWING TABLES
In connection with the following tables it should be noted that in
the Appellate Term, unlike the Appellate Division and Court of
Appeals, dismissals and discontinuances before argument or sub-
mission are included among figures listed as affirmances. Thus, in the
City Court figures, 20 out of 124 grantings affirmed and 6 out of 47
denials affirmed, and in the Municipal Court figures, 30 out of 284
grantings affirmed, and 39 out of 63 denials affirmed were dismissals
or discontinuances upon the calendar call.
It should be further noted that modifications have been included
under the heading of affirmances.
TABLE I
Number and Disposition of Summary Judgment Motions in Certain Appellate
Courts of New York
Percent- Number of Number of
Sum- age of Affirmances Reversals
Total Iny sumf De-
Appeals ment judg- Of Of De- Of Of De-
Ap- ment Grant- iiias - Grant- nialspeals to total ings ings
_________________appeals ___
1923 through 1931
Court of Appeals 4634 67* 1.4 41 3 I8 4
1922 through 1930
Appellate Division,
First Department 13,417 382t 2.9 146 127 58 39
Appellate Term,
First Department
a; City Court 2,597 248 9.5 124 47 54 23
b. Municipal Court, 12,351 6o9 4.9 284 1 63 254 8
*One not decisive.
tEight from Appellate Term and Four not decisive.
"'See Finch, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, March 14, 1932, at p. 1393.
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TABLE II
Proportion of Grantings to Denials of Summary Judgments Before and After
Appeal From 1921 Through 1930
Supreme Court-New York and Bronx Counties
Grantings Denials
No. Percentage No. Percentage
Originally 204 55.13 166 44.87
Ultimately 178 48.4 192 51.6
City Court-New York and Bronx Counties
Originally 178 71.77 70 28.23
Ultimately 148 59.68 100 40.32
Municipal Court-Manhattan and Bronx Boroughs
Originally 538 88.34 71 11.66
Ultimately 291 47.78 318 52.22
TABLE III
SUPREME COURT
Summary Judgments for New York County, Exclusive of those made during the
Summer Recess of Special Term for Trials, i. e., July, August and September
Total Motions Gantd Ded Withdrawn or ProportionYear on Calendar e enie Marked Off Granted to
I Denied
1921 12 not available not available
1922 174 not available not available
1923 447 208 I56 83 57-43
1924 546 220 178 148 55-45
1925 51I 236 174 101 57-43
1926 571 250 177 144 58-42
1927 433 217 184 32 54-46
1928 393 not available ;not available
1929 474 283 179 12 61-39
1930 667 395 1 249 23 61-39
Total 4228 1809 1297 543
It should also be observed that the figures of the Judicial Statistics
of the First Judicial Department make no mention of the fact that
the summary judgment motions there tabulated for the Supreme
Court, NewYork County, do not include summary judgment motions
made during the three summer months when Special Term for Trials
recesses, and that therefore only approximately three-quarters of the
total number of summary judgment motions made in the Supreme
Court, New York County, are tabulated. (Table No. III.)
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No comment is.made upon the showing of the individual judges,
either in the Supreme Court, City Court or Municipal Court, as re-
vealed by tables numbered IV, VIII and IX, because among other
things, there are no common bases for comparison. Thus in the City
and Municipal Courts (Tables No. VIII and No. IX) the total number
of summary judgment motions decided, granted and denied by each
judge is unknown. In the Supreme Court, New York County (Table
No. IV) only the total number of summary judgment motions decided
by each judge is known, but the number granted or denied by each
judge is unknown. The terms of office vary. If the total number of
motions heard or appeals taken is small, then the statistics have little
nieaning; that is, if less-than a fair-sized number of appeals per judge
are concerned, the proportions are of relatively small importance. And
finally, there are many important individual elements to be con-
sidered which are wholly outside of what statistics can ever reveal.
Therefore, in submitting these figures, interesting as they may be,
the writer cautions against their utilization to jump to hasty con-
clusions.
Note to Table IV
These cases include 36o from New-York County and io from Bronx
County, but exclude 4 cases, 3 from New York, i from Bronx, which
were not decisive of the motion for summary judgment, and 8 cases
from the Appellate Term, First Department, 4 from City Court, 4
from Municipal Court. The inclusion of the io cases from Bronx
County renders a slight allowance necessary in comparison with total
summary judgments heard and decided, set forth in column 2, since
the figures in that column do not include motions originating in
Bronx County. , Further allowances must be made in comparing total
appeals taken to total motions made below, since the figures in that
column do not include motions made in the courts below from the last
week in June to the last week in September. Upon adding the mo-
tions made for the thred summer months to the figures given in the
foregoing table, the percentage of total appeals to total motions will
be rendered considerably smaller than is indicated by the table.
GAA equals granted, affirmed, affiimed. GRD equals granted,
reversed, dismiised. GRA equals granted, reversed, affirmed. GAR
equals granted, affirmed, reversed. DRR equals denied, reversed,
reversed. DRA equals denied, reversed, affirmed. DAR equals
denied, affirmed, reversed.
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TABLE VI
History of Summary Judgment Appeals Reaching the Court of Appeals, 1923
Through 1931
Supreme Court Appellate Court of Appeals Denied Granted Not
Division Decisive
Granted Affirmed Affirmed and Granted 27
Granted Affirmed Reversed and Denied IO
Denied Reversed Affirmed and Granted 14a
Denied Reversed Reversed and Denied 8b
Granted Reversed Affirmed and Denied 3c
Granted Reversed Reversed and Granted 2
Denied Affirmed Affirmed and Denied
Denied Affirmed Reversed and Granted 2
21 45 I
a. Includes I case modified by increasing and affirmed and i case modified by
severing counterclaim and affirmed.
b. Includes z case granted in part, reversed and granted in full, reversed and
denied.
c. Includes I case granted, reversed, and dismissed after argument.
Only i case involved an additional intermediate appeal, a City Court judg-
ment granted and affirmed in all courts.
TABLE VII
Comparison Between Total Affirmances and Reversals in the Appellate Term of
the Supreme Court, First Judicial Department with Affirmances and Re-
versals of Summary Judgment Appeals to that Court from the Municipal
Court and City Court of the City of New York
Total Appeals Summary Judgment Appeals
Year Municipal Court City Court
Affirmances Reversals
Affirmances Reversals Affirmances Reversals
1922 1,502 499 3 7 3 6
1923 1,317 500 25 13 10 3
1924 1,218 515 20 9 14 6
1925 1,173 435 16 9 II 5
1926 I,139 430 41 33 13 4
1927 1,123 513 38 30 I8 7
1928 1,296 564 55 36 30 20
1929 1,161 545 65 56 30 10
1930 1,413 729 84 69 42 16
11,342 4730 347 - 262 171 77
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